Inequity aversion and team incentives

We study how the optimal contract in team production is affected when employees are averse to inequity in the sense described by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). By designing a reward scheme that creates inequity of the desired equilibrium, the employer can induce employees to perform effort at a lower total wage cost than when they are not inequity averse. We also show that the optimal output choice might change when employees are inequity averse. Finally, we show that an employer can gain, and never lose, by designing a contract that accounts for inequity aversion, even if employees have standard preferences

Electronic properties and quantum transport in Graphene-based nanostructures

61.46.-w Structure of nanoscale materials, 73.63.-b Electronic transport in nanoscale materials and structures,

Transverse momentum spectra of charged particles in proton-proton collisions at 1as=900 GeV with ALICE at the LHC

The inclusive charged particle transverse momentum distribution is measured in proton-proton collisions at s=900 GeV at the LHC using the ALICE detector. The measurement is performed in the central pseudorapidity region (|\u3b7|<0.8) over the transverse momentum range 0.15<10 GeV/c. The correlation between transverse momentum and particle multiplicity is also studied. Results are presented for inelastic (INEL) and non-single-diffractive (NSD) events. The average transverse momentum for |\u3b7|<0.8 is \u3008pT\u3009INEL=0.483\ub10.001 (stat.)\ub10.007 (syst.) GeV/c and \u3008pT\u3009NSD=0.489\ub10.001 (stat.)\ub10.007 (syst.) GeV/c, respectively. The data exhibit a slightly larger \u3008pT\u3009 than measurements in wider pseudorapidity intervals. The results are compared to simulations with the Monte Carlo event generators PYTHIA and PHOJET. \ua9 2010